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JUDICIAL HIGHLIGHT

I

PENNSYLVANIA DOMESTIC RELATIONS CASES OF 1959

By

CHARLES

E.

TORCIA,*

Assisted by Eugene J. Brew, Jr.
DIVORCE

Indignities
In Trueg v. Trueg,' a suit by a husband for divorce on the ground of indignities, it was shown that the "wife continually abused him verbally by
foul language and calling him vile names," not only when they were alone
"but also in the presence of friends and mutual acquaintances." His health
was so affected that "he couldn't work any, more." In ruling that the husband
had made out a case of indignity, i.e., that the wife's conduct rendered "his
condition intolerable and his life burdensome," the court took occasion to
illustrate the content of the term:
Indignity, as used in the statute authorizing divorce, may consist of vulgarity, unmerited reproach, habitual contumely, studied neglect, intentional
and every
incivility, manifest disdain, abusive language, malignant ridicule,
2
other plain manifestation of settled hate and estrangement.
In Sims v. Sims,3 where the parties lived in the home of the wife's parents, the wife continually berated the husband "for his failure to join the
church, nagged him, and refused him normal relations." In addition, violent
disputes grew out of political differences, and the husband was required to
sleep in the attic. To avoid controversy, "he was obliged to eat his meals
away from home" and "he mended his own clothes." In holding for the
husband, the court adopted the lower court's findings that the wife "clearly
showed her general hate, disregard and disrespect" for her husband and, "on
her own testimony stated that life for the last three years had been a living
4
hell. "
The principal complaint of the husband in Diehl v. Diehl 5 was that his
wife "continuously subjected him to excessive sexual demands." When he
* Assistant Professor of Law, Dickinson School of Law; LL.B., St. Johns University School
of Law.
1 190 Pa. Super. 78, 151 A.2d 786 (1959).
2Id.
at 82, 151 A.2d at 788.
3 188 Pa. Super. 439, 149 A.2d 528 (1959).
4Id. at 442, 149 A.2d at 531.
5 188 Pa. Super. 491, 149 A.2d 133 (1959).
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failed to respond, she "not only physically abused him by striking and scratching him and by throwing objects at him but also verbally abused him by calling him vile names." In addition, her violent temper culminated in her
"throwing dishes, breaking window panes, tearing off closet doors, hitting her
husband on the head with the heel of her shoe" and "making his life generally miserable." As a result, the husband became nervous, lost weight and
lost time from his work. The court, in finding for the husband, observed,
on the basis of the evidence produced, that an "inference of settled hate and
estrangement on the part of the wife" could be drawn. In concluding, it was
pointed out that "sexual excess," if it renders the condition of the spouse intolerable and life burdensome, constitutes indignities-and, if life be endangered, the excessive sexual demands may even rise to the status of "cruel and
barbarous treatment."
The husband prevailed in Pore v. Pore ' on a showing that his wife continually used "vile language" toward him; that she falsely accused him of
"running around"; that she gave him "only $.25 a day for his expenses";
that she "refused to be sociable with his friends and relatives when they called
at their home and ordered them out of the house"; that she falsely accused
him "both publicly and privately of unnatural conduct toward her and their
infant child"; and that she continually "nagged him and made life most
miserable and unhappy for him." The court placed great emphasis on the
wife's false charge of "unnatural conduct" on the part of the husband. While
it is true there was partial corroboration of the husband's testimony, the court
remarked that "a decree may be supported by the testimony of the plaintiff
alone."
In Davidson v. Davidson ' it appeared that the wife's great antipathy
toward the parents of her husband was the principal cause of their difficulties.
He was not permitted to visit his parents nor even to telephone them. The
wife did not permit their child to see the husband's parents and, when they
sent a snow suit as a gift for the child and gifts for him, she threw them down
and locked him out so that he had to live in a hotel for three days. Further,
on three occasions, he found it necessary to sleep in the bathroom; and, on
four or five occasions, he slept in the garage in his automobile. The main
objection of the wife was that the decree of divorce was based largely upon
the uncorroborated testimony of the husband. After observing that "a divorce
may be granted upon the uncorroborated testimony of the plaintiff unless that
testimony is not only contradicted, but shaken by the defendant," the court,
6 189 Pa. Super. 615, 151 A.2d 650 (1959).
7191 Pa. Super. 305, 156 A.2d 549 (1959).
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finding that the husband's testimony had not been "shaken," sustained the
decree of divorce.,
The husband in Ghent v. Ghent " pointed to the alleged "excessive drinking" of his wife. He frankly admitted, however, "that he drank to excess to
the degree of intoxication every weekend." Noting that the testimony tended
to show that the husband condoned, "if he did not actually encourage," whatever drinking the wife indulged in, the court concluded that the husband "certainly was not an injured and innocent spouse." Further, in deciding that the
husband's complaint had been properly dismissed, the court observed that
"even if both parties were equally at fault"-which, incidentally, the court
stated, had not been demonstrated-"we would leave them where they put
themselves." 10
Desertion
In MacDonnell v. MacDonnell" the husband obtained a divorce on the
ground of his wife's desertion. At the time of the marriage, the husband was
"a professional soldier and under orders to be moved from place to place."
The parties separated by mutual consent. Subsequently, the husband made
repeated attempts "to persuade his wife to join him at the various posts to
which he was assigned." She rejected the offers. It was clear that she had
no "reasonable cause"-that which would constitute a ground for divorceto refuse to live with him. In holding that the original separation by mutual
consent ripened into a desertion, the court declared the usual rule that the
husband's choice of a home "is controlling and the wife must abide by his
decision and live with him" applied with greater force to this case "because
the husband here had little choice as to the location of the home because of
his profession." 12
Again, the husband prevailed in Colin v. Colin." It seems that the wife
had departed from the matrimonial domicile, alleging cruel and barbarous
treatment and indignities, for which she sought a divorce, a mensa et thoro.
The divorce was denied and she continued to live apart from her husband.
Subsequently, the husband sought a divorce on the ground of desertion. The
court concluded, because the decision of the court denying relief to the wife
was res judicata, her absence thereafter was not predicted on "reasonable
8
9

Id. at 312, 156 A.2d at 551.

Super. -,
156 A.2d 354 (1959).
, 156 A.2d at 355.
1x 190 Pa. Super. 397, 154 A.2d 267 (1959).
12 Id. at 401, 154 A.2d at 269.
13 190 Pa. Super. 125, 151 A.2d 801 (1959).
0

-Pa.

1Id. at-
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cause." And, since she remained away for the requisite statutory period,
she was deemed guilty of desertion.
In Pingor v. Pingor" the husband failed to prove a desertion on the part
of his wife. The husband testified that his wife ordered him out of their home
and, "because she was stronger than he," he was "afraid" of her, and "had to
obey her." He admitted, however, "that his wife did not threaten him with
any physical violence at that time and that she never struck him or threatened
him with words at any time." "5 It appeared that, after the parties had been
living apart, the husband never asked his wife "if they could resume living
together." The appellate court, in affirming the order dismissing the husband's complaint, adopted the opinion of the lower court (per Judge Curran).
Judge Curran had said:
In order to establish a so-called "constructive desertion" as grounds for
divorce, the innocent spouse must show that he or she was wilfully or maliciously put out of the common home by force or justifiable fear of immediate
bodily harm or locked out against the will or without consent of the innocent
spouse and that such a condition has persisted for two years.16
After noting that "the burden is upon the plaintiff to prove his case by
a preponderance of clear and satisfactory evidence," the court concluded that
the husband's case fell "far short of that clear, satisfactory evidence required"
and hence, that a desertion had not been made out. 7
In Smith v. Smith," another unsuccessful suit by a husband for a divorce
on the ground of desertion, it appeared that the wife was "completely justified"
in ordering her husband from their home. Over a period of years, "he drank
intoxicants continuously and to excess and subjected his wife to embarrassment
and abuse." It was clear that his "violence, cruelty, continued intoxication,
and her fear of personal injury forced the wife to refuse further cohabitation."
Subsequently, the husband, claiming that he had "completely changed his way
of living," offered 'to establish a suitable home for himself and his wife,"
but she refused to live with him. The question before the court was whether
she became a deserter because of her refusal. The court, which affirmed on
the opinion of Judge Eagen of the court below, observed:
[I]f the husband subsequently changed his manner of living and made an
honest effort towards reconciliation and to act as a real husband should, his
wife would be legally obliged to reconsider and cooperate to the fullest. If
14 188 Pa. Super. 447, 149 A.2d 141 (1959).
15 Id. at 448, 149 A.2d at 142.
16 Id.

17 ld.
18 189 Pa. Super. 186, 150 A.2d 881 (1959).
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she refused, she would be guilty of wilful desertion from that point on. His
prior conduct would not justify her in refusing to live with him as husband
and wife forever. 19
After noting that the decision hinged on whether the husband made an
"honest and bona fide effort" to effect a reconciliation, and that, since "he
was to blame up to this point, it was his responsibility to carry the ball, so to
speak, in rectifying the situation," the court concluded "that his effort was insincere and not made in good faith." 2"
The husband again failed in Fitelson v. Fitelson.2' It seems, so the husband testified, that he desired his wife to move from Easton to Luzerne County,
but she refused. It was not in dispute "that a husband has the right to change
his home if his work, his comfort, or even if his convenience requires it, and
if the wife without reasonable cause refuses to join him, and if such home is
suitable within the husband's means and the choice thereof is made by him in
good faith, her refusal constitutes desertion." " But the husband's case rested
solely upon his own testimony, which was directly contradicted by the testimony
of the wife. And, the only other witness, their son, corroborated the testimony
of his mother. Under the circumstances, the court concluded that the husband
had not met the burden of establishing his wife's desertion by the requisite
"clear and convincing evidence."
In Jones v. Jones 23 the husband was denied a divorce on the ground of
desertion because: (1) the wife had "reasonable cause" to leave him; and,
in any event, (2) the husband was not an "innocent and injured spouse."
The parties had married in 1926; they separated for several months in 1938;
in 1943, the husband left his wife and set up a separate domicile; in 1947,
the wife took him back; finally, in 1953 she left him, and, upon the expiration of the statutory period, this action by the husband was instituted.
It seems that, from 1943 to 1947, the husband lived with another womanthe circumstances being such that adultery could be inferred-and his wife
had knowledge of this fact. Nevertheless, she accepted his promises to be
faithful and resumed living with him in 1947. In 1951 the husband engaged
in correspondence with that "other woman." The wife also discovered that
her husband was now associating with still another woman-but here, the
evidence was such that adultery could not be inferred. The court alluded to
the well settled rule that "reasonable cause," which will justify a spouse's
19 Id. at 188, 150 A.2d at 882.
20Id.
21 189

Pa. Super. 366, 150 A.2d 389 (1959).

22

ld. at 368, 150 A.2d at 390.

23

189 Pa. Super. 461, 151 A.2d 643 (1959).
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abandoning the other, "is that and only that which would entitle the separating party to a divorce." Because in 1947 the wife resumed cohabitation with
knowledge of the prior adulterous conduct of her husband, she would be
,deemed to have condoned the adultery and, since she would have been barred
from a divorce on that ground, she could not use that as reasonable cause for
leaving him. With respect to his infidelity after 1947, it could not satisfy the
requirement of reasonable cause for the reason that it did not amount to
adultery. However, the court observed, infidelities, falling short of adultery,
may constitute indignities, if such a course of conduct rendered the other
spouse's condition intolerable and life burdensome. But, because other evidence was present, the court was not required to decide whether the infidelities
alone would have constituted reasonable cause for the wife's departure. The
other evidence consisted of "striking her over the head with a ketchup bottle,
inflicting painful black and blue marks upon her, violently choking her, firing
a .38 revolver within a few feet of her, forcing her to sleep in a separate
room," etc.-which course of conduct brought a "nervous condition and failing health" upon the wife." ' In holding for the wife, the court declared:
It is apparent that even if we were to conclude that the evidence of infidelities, standing alone, would not justify her separation; and if we were to
conclude that the several acts of violence, standing alone, would not constitute
cruel and barbarous treatment, and so justify her separation; certainly, taken

together with the other facts in the record they establish by the overwhelming
preponderance of the evidence, a course of conduct that constitutes such indignities to her person as to render her condition intolerable, her life burdensome

and clearly justify her separation from her husband.25

Alternatively, the court remarked that the husband should be denied relief because-although he is not required to be wholly free from fault-he
was certainly not an "innocent and injured spouse."
In Jablonski v.Jablonski28 the supreme court took the occasion "to dispel
any confusion which may exist as to the shifting of the burden of proof in
divorce cases alleging desertion." The court said that a footnote in Larsen v.
Larsen: 2
[m)ight lead one to believe that when the plaintiff produces oral evidence that

the defendant withdrew from the marital domicile and the withdrawal was for
two continuous years, without more the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to
prove consent; and if consent is not proved a legal desertion is established to
the extent that such a ruling may be made in favor of the plaintiff as a matter
of law.28

24Id. at 467, 151 A.2d at 646.
25
8.
26

397 Pa. 452, 155 A.2d 614 (1959).

27 392 Pa. 609, 611, 141 A.2d 353, 354 (1958).
28 Supra, note 26.
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This, the court declared, is not correct. In aid of clarification, the court stated
the true rule thus:
It is necessary for the plaintiff, in order to establish desertion, to show that
the withdrawal from the domicile was both wilful and malicious and was persisted in for the required statutory period without reasonable cause; then if
defendant produces testimony showing consent of the plaintiff to the withdrawal, this evidence may or may not overcome the plaintiff's evidence of wilfullness and maliciousness in the mind of the factfinder. 29
CUSTODY

In Commonwealth ex rel. Horton v. Burke " the father sought the custody

of his 11-year-old daughter from her mother (the parties were divorced, and
the mother was now married to another). The court observed that in custody
cases the paramount consideration is the welfare of the child, and, unless there
are compelling reasons to the contrary, "a child of tender years should be
committed to the care and custody of its mother." It was emphasized that
this is especially true "where the child is a girl." The child indicated a preference to live with her mother. If the child is of sufficient intelligence, the
court felt her preference should be consulted. While, it is true, the father obtained a divorce from the mother, the court declared: "In determining whether
custody of a minor child should be given to her father or mother only the

welfare of the child and not the question of which of the parents is to blame
for failure of the marriage should be considered." " Finding that the mother
was a fit person, the court concluded that the child's welfare would be best
served by awarding custody to her.
Shoemaker Appeal 2 involved the custody of a female child, whose mother
had never been married and whose father's identity was unknown. In 1958
the mother was hospitalized, and the child (then six years of age) was placed
in the home of a neighboring couple. Shortly thereafter, the mother died.
An aunt-in-law of the child claimed entitlement to her custody. It was shown
that the neighbors had been married for ten years and had no children; he was
31 and she was 26 years of age; they owned a prosperous dairy farm and an
eight-room modern residence; 'both of them were regular church members;
they knew the child and her mother for five and a half years; they had for
some time been desirous of adopting children; upon the mother's death, they
took immediate steps to adopt the child; they loved the child very much, and
she apparently reciprocated this love. The child's closest relatives were a
2

Id.

30 190 Pa. Super. 392, 154 A.2d 255 (1959).
31 Id. at 396, 154 A.2d at 257.
32 396 Pa. 378, 152 A.2d 666 (1959).
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great-aunt, 78 years of age, from Iowa, who had never seen or contacted the
child; and the aunt-in-law (referred to earlier), 43 years of age, who lived
with her husband in New York, had five children, and had never shown the
slightest interest in the child's existence until about one month after the
mother's death. The court concluded that both the neighboring couple and
the aunt-in-law (and her husband) "have nice homes, and each family is
qualified by character and reputation to have the custody" of the child.3" However, the court felt the record disclosed that the best interests and welfare of
the child would be served in the community where she has always lived and
in the custody of the neighbors who have demonstrated their love and affection
for her. Earlier, the court had observed: "If all other factors are approximately equal, the courts should prefer a resident to a non-resident guardian
and custodian, since the former is more amenable to the Court's continuous
watchful eye, supervision and control." 34
Commonwealth ex rel. Carpenter v. Carpenter " was a habeas corpus action by the mother against the father (and his parents) to determine the
custody of their children-a boy of age two, and a girl of age four (at the time
of the hearing). The contest, however, was really between the mother and
the paternal grandparents because the father was in the army. It seems that
the father left the mother and children to live with his parents before his new
son was a week old. When the mother was attempting to secure employment
in Philadelphia, she left the children with an aunt, from whom the father and
his parents forcibly took the children. Instead of adducing testimony tending
to show the nature of care the children would receive with him and his parents, the father saw fit only to cast "aspersions" on his wife and her care of
the children by saying "she didn't like to change diapers too much." " Further, it was shown that the wife would be employed about eight hours per
day, Monday through Friday; and would be with the children when not working and at lunch everyday. The age of the grandparents was also noted. The
court alluded to the following well settled principles of law: That the needs
of a child of tender years ordinarily are best served by the mother and, therefore, unless there are compelling reasons to the contrary, such a child should
be placed in the custody of its mother; and, this is true even though other
suitable custodians have become attached to the child, and even though the
mother is compelled to work for a living. A careful study of the record impelled the court to conclude that the best interest and permanent welfare of
these very young children demanded that custody be awarded to their mother.
331d. at 383, 152 A.2d at 669.
34 Id. at 382, 152 A.2d at 669.
35 189 Pa. Super. 297, 150 A.2d 724 (1959).
36 Id. at 301, 150 A.2d at 726.
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In Urbani v. Bates "7the lower court (which was affirmed by the superior
court) awarded the custody of two children (2 and 3 years of age, respectively,
at the time of the hearing) to the father who had obtained a decree of divorce
from the mother. The mother had remarried. It seems that the lower court,
in awarding custody to the father, was influenced by the fact that the husband
was not guilty of any misconduct in causing a separation of the parties or their
divorce. In ruling that this constituted an abuse of judicial discretion, the
supreme court observed that the record reveals not a word to the effect that
the wife was not a "good mother." Indeed, "the evidence was all to the contrary." Thus, while it is true that the wife was guilty of some form of indiscretion, "it never encroached upon her full-hearted devotion to the welfare of
her children." As aptly stated by the court, "the rock on which a marriage
splits is not the touchstone for determining the custody of children." 31 While
a father can be "a Sir Galahad in deportment and a Hercules in strength," he
may stand "helpless before the task of feeding, changing, and dressing" children of tender years. 9 In sum, the only concern of the court is the welfare
of the children, and not the relative fault of the parents-so long, of course,
as the "fault" does not bear upon the parent's ability to properly care for the
child. After studying the record, the court concluded that, considering the
tender ages of the children, their best interests would be served by being placed
in the custody of their mother. The father was allowed rights of visitation
"for not less than two days each week." 40
In Commonwealth ex rel. Skyanier v. Skyanier,4" after the parties separated, the wife and child (5-year-old female) went to live with the maternal
grandparents. The lower court granted the father's petition for visitation,
allowing him to have the child from Friday to Sunday every weekend. The
court felt "that the best interest of the child will be served by maintaining a
close relationship with both parents." 4 After noting that a "normal relationship with both parents should be maintained," the appellate court, feeling
that the lower court had not abused its discretion, chose not to interfere. The
dissent laid great stress on the fact that the child should not be subjected to
the "obviously disturbing influence of the paternal grandparents" (with whom
the father lived)." Also, the elimination of week-end contact between the
child and her mother was deemed hurtful to the child.
31 395 Pa. 187, 149 A.2d 644 (1959).

Id. at 192, 149 A.2d at 646.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 196, 149 A.2d at 648.
41 190 Pa. Super. 56, 151 A.2d 817 (1959).
42 Id. at 57, 151 A.2d at 818.
43 Id. at 60, 151 A.2d at 819.
38
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ADOPTION

A petition was filed in Albee Appeal " for the adoption of a child born
out of wedlock (the child was then about one month old). The child had
been turned over to the petitioners by the natural mother, and the requisite
consents of the natural mother and putative father had been attached to the
petition. At the time of the hearing, the natural mother, who had since returned to her native Germany, communicated to petitioners her desire for the
return of her baby. Even though the natural mother did not appear in person
at the hearing, because of her absence in Germany-she was represented, however, by counsel-the appellate court held: "it having been made clear to
the court that the mother's consent to the adoption had been withdrawn, it
was entirely proper for the court to dismiss the petition for adoption." 45 Since
the petition for adoption did not contain an averment of "abandonment,"
that issue, of course, was not before the court. Treating the matter as a "custody" proceeding, in pursuance of a stipulation entered into between the parties, the lower court awarded custody of the child to the natural mother.
In affirming, the appellate court declared:
There was nothing in the record to show that the mother was in any way
unfit to have the custody of her child and in the absence of such showing the
law presumes that the welfare46 of a child of tender age is best promoted by
giving custody to the mother.
The dissent felt that the lower court did not have sufficient evidence before it to conclude that it was in the best interests of this child "to tear him
from the only home he has ever known and direct that he be transported thousands of miles outside the jurisdiction of this Court and given to a mother
who did not appear before the Court and who, as a practical matter, is a complete stranger in a foreign land."
In In re Stone 4 the subject of adoption was a female child (about one
year of age at the time of the hearing) born out of wedlock. About seven
weeks prior to her birth and four days subsequent thereto, the natural mother
executed written consents to the child's adoption. At the hearing, however,
the mother appeared, withdrew her consents and objected to the proposed
adoption. While the mother had the right, even at the time of the hearing,
to withdraw her earlier consents, "such consents, if given voluntarily and intelligently, may be considered on the question of abandonment." The appellate
44 189 Pa. Super. 370, 150 A.2d 563 (1959).
45 Id. at 374, 150 A.2d at 565.

Id. at 376, 150 A.2d at 566.
Id.
f8Pa. , 156 A.2d 808 (1959).
46
4T
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court, finding that an abandonment had been made out, declared that for upwards of six months,4" "the conduct of the natural mother evidenced a settled
purpose of relinquishing her claim to this child and no attempt on her part
to indicate any interest in this child." 5" However, it was pointed out that
the lower court failed to make findings on two questions which required determination before any final conclusion of the proceeding could be reached:
(1) should the fact that this child was born of a Protestant mother preclude
its adoption by persons of the Jewish faith; "' and (2) will the best interests
and welfare of the child be promoted by this adoption.
In In re Young 52 the mother consented to the adoption of her infant child,
but the father did not. However, in finding for the adoptive parents, the court
concluded that the father had "abandoned" the child for the requisite sixmonth period-hence his consent was unnecessary. A revealing picture of the
justification for the consequences flowing from "abandonment" is here ably
painted: Even if the parent's belated declaration of attachment to his child
is sincere, "he still may not have him. This is not a matter of punishment to
a father for his past sins; it is a matter of concern for the child's present welfare and its future well-being. The life of a tender child may be so damaged
by neglect that no amount of contrition on the part of the redeeming parent
can repair, mend, or heal the hurt." " The court continued:
The Legislature thus acted wisely in warning all parents that if for a period
of at least six months they fail to supply the bottle of milk, the change of
clothing, the cradle of comfort, and the counterpane of love which are the breath
of life to an infant, they may be confronted with the charge of abandonment
of their child. And once the statutory limits have been passed and adoption is
in the process of being effected a thousand cradles will not win back the for5
saken child. 4

In In re Maisels " the father consented to the adoption of a six year old
female child, but the mother did not. It seems that, after a divorce between
the parties, the child lived for a time with the mother but, subsequently, she
called upon her former husband to come and take the child. Thereupon,
although divorced, the parties lived together again with the child. Although
the circumstances attending the event were equivocal, the child found its way
into the home of an aunt and uncle--the parties seeking the adoption of the
49

50

ANN. tit. 1, § 1 et. seq. (1953).
, , 156 A.2d 808, 812.
STAT. ANN. tit. i, § i(d) (1953): "[W]henever possible, the petitioners shall be of

PA. STAT.
Pa. -

51 PA.

the same religious faith as the natural parents of the child to be adopted.
52395 Pa. 558, 150 A.2d 845 (1959).
531d. at 565, 150 A.2d at 848.
54Id.

"5 395

Pa. 329, 149 A.2d 38 (1959).
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child in this proceeding-with whom she has remained ever since. Finding
that the mother, for a period of over six months, "completely and wholly forgot
the child and her maternal duties toward the child," the court concluded that
the mother's consent to the adoption was unnecessary because the evidence
was legally sufficient to support abandonment. Further, the court found the
child's welfare and best interests will be promoted by her adoption by the
aunt and uncle. It was shown, inter alia, that, "for four and one-half years
they have given their love and affection to her, to them she is their daughter
and to her they are her parents." "
ALIMONY PENDENTE LITE AND COUNSEL FEES

In Davidson v. Davidson,"7 where the husband obtained a decree of divorce on the ground of indignities, the husband was ordered to pay the sum
of $250 as preliminary counsel fees and $75 per month as alimony pendente
lite to the life. After the hearing, which covered seven days and 833 typewritten pages of testimony, the lower court awarded $1,000 as additional counsel fees to the wife's attorney. In measuring the amount of counsel fees allowed, the criteria considered were the value of the counsel's services, the
wife's necessities, and the husband's ability to pay. To deny a destitute wife
the means to pay for professional aid is "to deny her justice," and likewise to
deny a husband a divorce unless he pay counsel fees beyond his ability to pay
is "to close the doors of the court to many worthy suitors." The court noted
that the counsel fee allowance should be "reasonable" to the end that fair
and impartial justice will be promoted "by placing the parties on a par in
defending their rights." In concluding that the lower court did not abuse its
discretion the court noted that the "reduced purchasing power of the dollar"
should also be taken into consideration.
In Scherer v. Scherer "8the wife, who brought an action for divorce from
bed and board, after the hearing, obtained an order requiring the husband to
pay $200 for counsel fees, to make payments upon the homestead owned by
the entireties, and to pay $50 per week for alimony pendente lite. Because of
the limited ability of the husband to pay-even though, theretofore, the parties
lived more comfortably-the court reduced the alimony pendente lite to $25
per week.
In Chambers v. Chambers," a divorce action from bed and board, the
sum of $1,250 was allowed for counsel fees. In the light of the "compre56

57
58

Id. at 337, 149 A.2d at 41.

-Pa.
Super.-, 156 A.2d 553 (1959).
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hensive amount of services involved in the preparation, and negotiations in
this case in attempting to effect a property settlement," " this was held not
to constitute an abuse of discretion.
SUPPORT

Commonwealth ex rel. Trichon v. Trichon 6 involved an order for the
wife's support which was reduced from $70 to $50 per week. It was shown
that, because of "financial reverses," the husband's gross income, which theretofore had been $20,000 per year, was now $13,119.61. Finding that the husband had shown the requisite change in conditions and circumstances, the
court held that this did not constitute an abuse of discretion.
The original order of support in Commonwealth ex rel. Meth v. Meth 62
was for $10 per week; this was increased to $25 per week, and subsequently
reduced to $20 per week. The wife petitioned for an increase in support.
Among other things, the wife showed that "she was accustomed to furs and
now must wear cloth coats, and that she enjoyed expensive cultural pursuits
which she is now required to forego." 63 However, it was noted, the order
which ranged from $10 at its lowest point and $25 at its highest was not based
on the type of standard of living which the wife would like to enjoy. No
appeal had been taken from any of the prior orders. In holding that the
lower court, in denying the relief requested, had not abused its discretion, the
appellate court declared that, while a support order may be reduced, increased
or vacated upon a proper showing, a party cannot "repetitiously present evidence of alleged change in circumstances that by prior orders were res judicata." 6
In Commonwealth ex rel. Litz v. Litz 65 the latest order provided that the
husband pay $34 per week for the support of his wife and their 8 year-old
daughter. The husband petitioned for a reduction in amount. The court felt
that the husband "has earning power far in excess of the $75 per week which
he contends is the total gross amount of his earnings." It was noted that
"earning power" may be considered-not only "actual total earnings"-and
the nature and extent of one's property and financial resources, other than
wages, may also be considered. Finding, inter alia, that the husband "has used
his mother as a screen to conceal his real earning power and to hide his assets" 66
60 Id. at 507, 149 A.2d at 533.
61 189 Pa. Super. 395, 150 A.2d 176 (1959).

188 Pa. Super. 553, 149 A.2d 488 (1959).
Id. at 556, 149 A.2d at 490.
64 Id. at 558, 149 A.2d at 490.
65 190 Pa. Super. 310, 154 A.2d 420 (1959).
66Id. at 311, 154 A.2d at 421.
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-he worked for his mother as a bartender and manager of her taproom; the
dwelling house of the parties (husband and wife, before the separation) was
purchased by the husband for $8,000, but title was taken in his mother's name
-the court concluded that the lower court, in denying relief to the husband,
had not abused its discretion.
In Commonwealth ex rel. Wills v. Bonetti 67 an outstanding order provided that the husband pay $45 per week for the support of his three minor
children. After a divorce both parties had remarried and the children were
living with their mother and her husband. The husband (father of the children) admitted the fairness of the amount, but petitioned that payments be
suspended temporarily so that he could revive his failing construction business. It seems that the case had been before the lower court 26 times; there
had been 10 hearings in open court; and there had been 13 orders, 8 continuances and 5 bench warrants. The husband delayed payments from time
to time, but paid them "often in large lump sums, only to keep out of or to
get out of jail." While the husband claimed that other persons provided him
with the funds needed to make payments on arrears, the court felt that the
real source was his business, investments, property, income and earnings. Virtually everytime the case came before the court the husband asserted that he
was still "trying desperately to straighten out his affairs, but to date has not
achieved any success in that direction." 8 It was pointed out, however, that
no reason had ever been assigned for the .failure of the business, no petition in
bankruptcy had ever been filed, nor had an assignment for the benefit of creditors ever been made. The appellate court held that the husband "could not
escape liability for the support of his children at their expense by concentrating his energies on the revival of a defunct business," and that the lower court
had not abused its discretion in finding that the husband had "sufficient resources in property and in earning power to comply with the order." 69
The mother of two minor children in Hecht v. Hecht 70 petitioned for an
increase in the amount paid by the father for the support of their children. It
seems that the husband and wife had entered into a separation agreement under
which, inter alia, the father was to pay the mother $325 per month for the
support of the children. Shortly thereafter, the parties were divorced. The
father remarried; the mother did not. Subsequently, as the children grew
older, the father voluntarily raised his monthly payments to $350. At the time
of the separation agreement, the father's earned income was about $12,000
67

190 Pa. Super. 335, 154, A.2d 404 (1959).

68 Id. at 338, 154 A.2d at 406.

69 Id.
70 189 Pa. Super. 276, 150 A.2d 139 (1959).
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per year, and he had assets of about $100,000. Thereafter, the father inherited nearly a half-million dollars. The mother testified that she would
like to send the children to summer camps in Maine, to give them music lessons, dancing lessons and dramatic lessons. The father was willing to pay for
a summer camp in Florida, but felt that the camp in Maine was too expensive.
The amount of $325, set forth in the separation agreement as support for the
children, was of course not binding upon the court. Had the payments of $350
per month been made under an order of court, the mother would have had
the burden of showing "changed circumstances"; but since it was the product
of agreement, the question before the court was "what order should the court
impose in the light of present circumstances." The court alluded to the well
settled rule that, in measuring the amount for the support of children, the court
should always have in mind "the property and earning capacity of the father
and the station in life of the parties." 71 The lower court, in setting the
amount at $400 per month, felt that the fact that the father inherited a half
million dollars "should not be considered, because this would be a means of
having the children share in their father's inheritance." "7 "Of course," the
appellate court observed, "it is not the purpose of a support order to distribute
the father's estate," but that "does not mean, however, that the father's property and condition in life is not relevant in determining the amount of the
order." " in ruling that the amount for support should be increased to $550
per month, the court held that the husband's "property and condition in life
must be considered," and that "a wealthy father has a legal duty to give his
children the 'advantages' which his financial status indicates to be reasonable." "
In Commonwealth ex rel. Lorusso v. Lorusso " the parties had separated
and the husband was ordered to pay $130 per month for his wife's support.
The husband obtained a decree of divorce in Nevada; the wife had been personally served in Pennsylvania; and she did not appear personally in the Nevada proceeding. Since a valid decree of divorce terminates the duty of. a
husband to support his wife, if the Nevada divorce were valid in Pennsylvania,
the support order, and arrearages accrued after the divorce, would be vacated
-if the divorce were not valid in Pennsylvania, the duty to support continued.
The Nevada decree of divorce, in Pennsylvania, "is a conclusive adjudication
of everything involved therein except the jurisdictional facts on which it is
founded." '6 "Domicile" is a jurisdictional fact. Hence, the bona fides of the
71 Id. at 281, 150 A.d at 142.
72 Id. at 282, 150 A.2d at 143.
7
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76 Id. at 406, 150 A.2d at 372.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

(VOL. 64

domicile is properly subject to attack in Pennsylvania. The full faith and
credit clause, the court observed, "requires us to assume" that the husband had
a bona fide domicile in Nevada"; and, "the burden is on the party attacking
the divorce of a sister state to show by a preponderance of the evidence that
jurisdiction was in fact lacking." " A new domicile is effected by "a change
of residence with a present intention to live at the new place permanently or
indefinitely." " The court held the wife failed to overcome the presumption
that the husband had a bona fide domicile in Nevada. That being so, the
validity of the Nevada divorce was entitled to recognition in Pennsylvania.
In Samuels v. Hirz 11 the parties had separated and the husband was under
an order of support. The wife died and her daughter paid the bills in connection with her last illness and funeral. The court held that the husband,
at common law, is liable for his wife's funeral expenses, and it matters not
that they were living apart at the time of her death. It was also held that the
husband was liable for the expenses of his wife's last illness. In that connection, after quoting a portion of section 622 of the Fiduciaries Act,8" the court
concluded that, by statute, "expenses of the last illness are placed in the same
classification and have the same order of payment as funeral expenses." " It
is clear, declared the court, that where the parties are not living apart, the
surviving husband is liable for the expenses of her last illness and death. The
court added, "we perceive no logical difference between the wife's funeral
expenses and the expenses of her last illness"-and, as noted earlier, it is immaterial that the parties were separated. In ruling that the daughter could
recover the amounts paid from the husband, the court refused to place her
in the category of a "mere volunteer"-noting that this view "is in accord with
the rule in other jurisdictions." 82
The wife in Commonwealth ex rel. Scarpato v. Scarpato 83 left her husband because, he testified, "she was pregnant and he had nothing to do with
it." She petitioned to the court for support, but her petition was denied. She
took no appeal; therefore, the adjudication became res judicata. Subsequently,
the wife again petitioned for support and the court entered an order therefor.
This was held to constitute error. For, in connection with the earlier proceedings, it was clear that the husband had valid grounds-that which would
constitute a ground for divorce-for refusing to support his wife. And, "the
77 Id. at 407,
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78Sd.
79 189 Pa. Super. 492, 151 A.2d 640 (1959).
80 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 320.622 (1949).
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facts which precluded a right to support are deemed to continue and the wife,
in the instant proceeding, utterly failed to show a change of circumstances." 8
In Commonwealth ex rel. Levitz v. Levitz 88 the husband was ordered to
pay $140 per week for the support of his wife, and $25 per week for the support of his daughter. It seems that the wife may have been "indiscreet" in her
association with one Katz, but there was at that time an insufficient demonstration of adultery. Subsequently, the husband petitioned the court to revoke the
order for support, but the lower court denied the relief requested. The appellate court reversed, holding that the lower court abused its discretion in
refusing to vacate the support order for the wife, but the order of support for
the daughter was not disturbed. It seems that Katz had turned over to the
husband a bundle of letters written by the wife to Katz; she admitted writing
and sending these letters; and she admitted "having cocktails with him in her
hotel rooms and going out to dinner and theater engagements with him." 8
There were a number of passages in the letters, the court observed, "which
clearly show that Mrs. Levitz did commit adultery with Mr. Katz." "' It being
clear that adultery on the part of a wife is a defense to the entry of an order
for her support, the court saw fit to allude to the "inclination and opportunity
rule"-useful when there is no direct evidence of the fact of adultery. In
pursuance of this doctrine, adultery will be presumed where the following is
shown: "(1) the adulterous disposition or inclination of the defendant; (2)
the adulterous disposition, or inclination, of the co-respondent; and (3) the
opportunity created to satisfy their mutual adulterous inclination." 88 The
court concluded that the evidence supported the application of the doctrine.
In Commonwealth ex rel. Margiasso v. Margiasso 89 the parties separated
and no provision was then made for the wife's support. Subsequently-eight
years later-the husband was ordered to pay his wife $20 per week for her
support. During the eight-year period, the husband paid nothing and she
supported herself. It was shown that the wife had "reasonable cause" for
leaving her husband--"excessive demands for sexual relations" and the "resulting strife from her refusal to submit to him." That being so, the court
concluded, in sustaining the support order, "the delay of eight years following
the separation in pressing her petition has no effect on the wife's right to sup841d. at 48, 151 A.2d at 785, 786.
85 189 Pa. Super. 438, 150 A.2d 581 (1959).
88ld. at 442, 150 A.2d at 583.
87 Id. at 442, 150 A.d at 584.
8
81d. at 444, 150 A.2d at 584. (The court quoted from
DIVORCE IN PENNSYLVANIA, Vol. 1, p. 456, 2nd ED.)
89 190 Pa. Super. 637, 155 A.2d 226 (1959).
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port. The mere fact that she was able to maintain herself for many years did
not relieve her husband from his obligation to support her." 10
The supreme court in MacDougall v. MacDougall9 took the occasion
to point up the significance of a separation agreement between a husband and
wife on the rights of their children to support:
A consensual separation of husband and wife, with or without reasonable
grounds, does not necessarily mean that the father had reasonable grounds for
leaving his children. While it is true that contracts of husband and wife, if
fairly made, are generally considered binding as to them, a mother cannot by
contract bargain away the right of her minor children to adequate support from
their father irrespective of the legality of the agreement between the parties
themselves.92
In Wolfsohn v. Solms " the husband and wife had entered into a separation agreement under which she was to receive weekly payments for one year
and to continue thereafter for yearly terms until written notice of termination
be given. About eight months before the expiration of the first yearly term,
the husband died. In 1958 9 the supreme court held that the wife was entitled
to the payments up to the close of the first yearly term. On the present appeal
the wife contended that she was entitled to payments from the end of the first
year up until the commencement of the present suit because no formal written
notice had been given. In holding that the wife was not entitled to such payments, the court pointed out that the reason why the agreement survived the
death of the husband and bound his executor for the term of one year was
because there was valid consideration to support his promise to pay for the
period of one year-under the agreement, she was required to execute a joint
tax return with her husband and she did so. Since the husband is now deceased, the wife can no longer perform "her obligation to execute a joint return." Hence, there was "a failure of consideration" which rendered the
agreement, after the first year, ineffective."9
ALIMONY

In Marra v. Marra " the wife was granted a divorce a mensa et thoro and
awarded permanent alimony of $300 per month which was reduced by a subsequent order to $160 per month. The husband petitioned for a further decrease. It was shown by the husband that his income was limited to interest
at 21/2 per cent on United States government bonds having a value of $112,000
90 ld. at 638, 155 A.2d at 227.
91 397 Pa. 340, 155 A.2d 358 (1959).
92 Id. at 343, 155 A.2d at 360.
93 396 Pa. 206, 152 A.2d 237 (1959).
94392 Pa. 129, 139 A.2d 523 (1958).
95 396 Pa. 206, 208, 152 A.2d 237, 238.
96 189 Pa. Super. 180, 149 A.2d 175 (1959).
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or an annual income of $2,800. Accordingly, the husband argued, the alimony
payments may not exceed one-third " of the $2,800. In rejecting his claim
the court declared that, in fixing the amount of alimony, it may consider not
only the actual income received, but also his property, earning power, and all
the other attendant circumstances. Further, in addition to the government
bonds valued at $112,000, he formed a corporation which had an income of
$2,543 one year, and in which he invested $10,00,0; and he purchased a $4,800
automobile which he transferred to the corporation. It was aptly put that the
husband "has embarked upon a plan whereby he is able to preserve the principal of his estate in a form of ready availability" and, at the same time, render
the wife practically destitute by converting "virtually all of his property into
low earning securities or property producing no income." 9 In ruling that
the lower court had not abused its discretion when it denied his petition for
a reduction in the amount of alimony, the court observed: "Should we decide
otherwise a husband with a million dollar estate could reduce it to cash, live
in luxury on his principal and pay his wife nothing." " It was noted that
there does not seem to be any good reason why the husband, "an inventor and
a skilled mechanic, should not be gainfully employed." 100
The wife in Appleton v. Appleton 101 was granted a divorce a mensa et
thoro and awarded permanent alimony in the sum of $36.80 per month. The
husband, 62 years of age, had been a business executive of exceptional ability
commanding an income through the years ranging from $35,000 to more than
$100,000. However, he was unemployed at the time of this action and had
suffered a slight stroke. While he had a sizable estate, most of it was pledged
as security for loans made by him, prior to this proceeding, in the ordinary
course of business. His present net income was $1,325.48. The lower court
decided that the husband's "earning capacity" was negligible. In holding this
to be an abuse of discretion, the appellate court noted that the husband's
"slight stroke" could not be said to have measurably impaired his earning
capacity, and that because of his proven ability and experience, he undoubtedly
had many contacts still active in the business community. The court observed:
"Agencies are active throughout the country securing positions for business
executives over 65 years of age who for some reason were forced into retirement." 102 Accordingly, the husband "cannot wilfully now choose to retire
from gainful employment and deny his wife the alimony it is his duty to atOT PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 47: "In cases of divorce from bed and board, the court may allow
the wife such alimony as her husband's circumstances will admit of, but the same shall not exceed
the third part of the annual profit or income of his estate, or his occupation and labor.
98 189 Pa. Super. 180, 182, 149 A.2d 175, 176.
99 Id. at 183, 149 A.2d at 177.
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tempt to supply." ' His "earning capacity" was determined to be $7,500,
which, together with his actual income, amounted to a base of $8,825 for alimony purposes-impelling the court to raise the alimony to $245 per month.
Two Judges dissented.
COMMON LAW MARRIAGE

In Commonwealth ex rel. Pilla v. Pilla 104 one Nora Pilla petitioned for
support on the ground that a valid common law marriage existed between her
and Carl Pilla. It seems that the parties entered into a meretricious relationship in 1949 or 1950, at which time Carl was a married man with three children. Carl's wife divorced him in 1952. Nora testified that the parties entered
into an agreement of marriage in 1952. Carl denied this, and this was supported by the fact that the parties in 1957 took blood tests, obtained a license,
and had a minister waiting, but Carl refused to go through with the ceremony.
The court saw fit to disbelieve Nora's claim that an agreement was entered
into, and, even if there were an agreement, it was of no effect because Carl
was then still married. That being so, it was unnecessary for the court to
determine whether the words constituting the alleged common law agreement
were the required verba de praesenti. Insofar as evidence of cohabitation and
reputation was concerned, in the light of Carl's disability, it disclosed only a
meretricious relationship. And, a meretricious relationship once established
is presumed to continue. It can be converted into a valid marriage only by
a subsequent agreement between the parties, after the disability has been removed. Here, of course, there was a failure of proof with respect to an agreement. Hence Nora's petition for support was denied.
In In re Dennis 105 the claimant, asserting that she was the common law
widow of decedent, petitioned unsuccessfully to take against his will. She
attempted to prove the marriage by proof of cohabitation and reputation.
There was clear proof of cohabitation-the woman bore a child to the decedent. Evidence of reputation, however, was "woefully lacking," i. e., as pointed
out by the lower court, there was no showing that the parties were "generally
recognized in the community as husband and wife"; there was no evidence
"that decedent ever regarded her, held her out as, or referred to claimant as
his wife, or that claimant regarded herself as his wife." 106
MISCELLANEOUS

In Wisecup v. Wisecup 107 the husband, who had obtained a decree of
divorce, upon learning that he was never married to his wife because of her
103 Id.
104
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105 394 Pa. 296, 147 A.2d 419 (1959).
106 Id. at 297, 147 A.2d at 419, 420.
107 190 Pa. Super. 384, 154 A.2d 332 (1959).
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prior subsisting marriage to another man, attempted unsuccessfully to cause
the record to be opened to show that fact for the purpose of obtaining an annulment. The husband contended that "a valid marriage between the parties
is a jurisdictional pre-requisite to a decree in divorce." 108 It was conceded by
the court that unless there be a valid marriage, there could be no granting of
a divorce, but the proper remedy would be an annulment. This does not
mean, said the court, that there would not be jurisdiction over the subject
matter. For, "the parties had gone through a ceremony of marriage," they
were "properly before the court, and the court had jurisdiction to adjudicate
the status between them." 109 The illegality of the marriage, it was held, did
not destroy the jurisdiction of the court to grant a decree of divorce. Further,
it was pointed out, "if the petitioner were successful in this action, two children born of the marriage would be bastardized." 110
In Branch v. Branch ...the lower court had entered a decree of divorce
in favor of the husband on the ground of the wife's adultery. The wife did
not appeal, but the named corespondent in the action did take an appeal. The
husband moved to quash the appeal on the ground that the corespondent had
no authority to take an appeal. The question-whether the corespondent
could appeal-was said to be one of first impression. To begin with, it was
pointed out, the right of appeal is conferred "solely by statute" and does not
otherwise exist. Only two statutes were seemingly applicable: (1) "Either
of the parties in any suit or action for divorce may appeal ... 112 On the
theory that "either" meant "each of two," the court concluded that the legislature had reference to the husband and wife, and thus did not intend to include the corespondent. And, even assuming that "either" could be said to
mean "any," the corespondent would still be required to establish that he
was a "party" in the action. (2) In the other statute the plaintiff is required,
in an action on the ground of adultery, to give the named corespondent written
notice of the pendency of the action so that "he may appear and be heard." 11
But this, the court pointed out, does not purport to make the corespondent a
"party"; he is merely accorded the opportunity to be heard. Neither
statute,
then, makes the corespondent a party. That being so, the corespondent has
no right to take an appeal. The court observed that, while a decree may be
108

Id. at 388, 154 A.2d at 335.

109 Id.

110 It is to be noted that, as of December 17, 1959, a statute now provides: "In all cases where
a supposed or alleged marriage is contracted which is absolutely void by reason of one of the
parties thereto having a spouse living at the time of the supposed marriage, or if for any other
lawful reason the said marriage was void or voidable when contracted, all children born to such
parties shall be deemed the legitimate children of both parties for all purposes." (Act. No. 695.)
11 188 Pa. Super. 587, 149 A.2d 573 (1959).
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hurtful to the reputation of one named as a corespondent, it is not an adjudication against the corespondent and has only the indirect consequence "that
the defendant cannot marry him as long as the plaintiff lives." "I The court
added that whether the corespondent should be made a party and accorded the
right to appeal is a "legislative and not a judicial problem."
Karchner v. Mumie,"' a case of first impression, involved the question of
whether a married woman could bring an action for criminal conversation.
At common law, it was pointed out, only the husband could maintain the action.
At that time the suit was brought against the man with whom the wife committed adultery, and was deemed to be the "civil counterpart of the criminal
charge of adultery." (The fact that the defendant here, being unmarried,
was not guilty of adultery, was considered by the court not to be "decisive.")
Procedurally and substantively, at common law, the wife had no right of action. Under the Married Women's Property Act of 189 3 ,"'A however, a married woman became procedurally authorized to sue in her own name as if she
-were unmarried. And, while a married woman was not thereby accorded
the substantive rights of a husband, the court declared that "the general
emancipation of women in America did not begin or end with the Act of
1893." "' Hence, it was said, "the common law rights of married women
have advanced throughout our nation" to such an extent that the majority
view in America now permits a married woman to maintain a criminal conversation action. The court, however, was not required to rest its decision
on the common law. For, the Act of 1945 118 (as confirmed by the Act of
1951 119) gave married women the rights not only of an unmarried person
(as in the Act of 1893), "but rather the same rights as a 'married man'." And
so, the court noted, there is "no distinction between the substantive property
rights of a married man and a married women," and the Act of 1893 "still
procedurally authorized her to sue in her own name as if she were unmarried." 12 The court concluded:
It would appear, therefore, that criminal conversation is a tort and is redressable by an action of trespass by a wife against one who has sexual intercourse with her husband. The compensatory damages allowable in such an
action are injury to the wife's social position, disgrace in the community where
she lives or was engaged in business, and dishonor to herself and her family.121
188 Pa. Super. 587, 594, 149 A.2d 573, 577.
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